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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Appellants John A. Ferraro and Dorothy Ferraro, who are 
husband and wife, appeal from an order dated August 23, 1993, and 
entered on August 31, 1993, dismissing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) their claims against the appellees, the City of Long 
Branch, New Jersey, and certain of its officials, brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and remanding the balance of the 
case to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth 
County.  As a matter of convenience we refer to John A. Ferraro 
as the appellant inasmuch as Dorothy Ferraro is a party only 
because she claims a loss of consortium.   
 Insofar as material to the section 1983 count, Ferraro 
in his Superior Court complaint alleged that since November 20, 
1979, he has been a career civil service employee of the City of 
Long Branch with the classified job title of Superintendent of 
Parks and Public Property.  He further alleged that the duties of 
that position are essentially of a managerial, supervisory, and 
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planning nature, but that the appellees nevertheless directed him 
"to perform such jobs as garbage pick up, shoveling beach sand, 
and other physical labor under the supervision of [his] former 
subordinates . . . ."  Ferraro claimed that the appellees' action 
deprived him of his rights, privileges, and immunities under New 
Jersey laws and regulations and "subjected [him] to the 
deprivation of a legally protected property right in his 
employment secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States and the State of New Jersey without due process of law in 
violation of those Constitutions and the statutes in such cases 
made and provided."   
 The complaint alleged that the appellees engaged in the 
foregoing wrongful conduct on and before December 28, 1990. While 
the complaint does not indicate precisely what happened on 
December 28, 1990, in his brief Ferraro indicates that he 
"collapsed [with a heart attack] on the job while shoveling snow 
on the steps of City Hall," and is still under treatment and has 
"never returned to work."  Brief at 5.  In deciding this case we 
will assume that Ferraro can prove these allegations and present 
evidence that his work assignment contributed to his collapse and 
illness.  The complaint also included three state law counts for 
what Ferraro called "tortious interference with pursuit of lawful 
employment" and for violations of the New Jersey Administrative 
Code.  Notably, however, Ferraro's complaint did not assert that 
the appellees' conduct constructively discharged him, and thus he 
did not allege, and even in his brief on this appeal, does not 
claim that he is no longer a Long Branch employee.  In fact, he 
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acknowledges that he still is the Superintendent of Parks and 
Public Property.   
 The appellees removed the matter to the district court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the ground that it had original 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).  They then 
served a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, on the grounds of 
qualified immunity." 
 The district court granted the appellees' motion in an 
oral opinion on August 23, 1993.  The court recited that it could 
grant the motion only if, after accepting the well-pleaded 
allegations in the complaint and viewing them in the light most 
favorable to Ferraro, he could prove no set of facts entitling 
him to relief.  The court then observed that it was "well 
established that government officials performing discretionary 
functions enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages when their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."  The court next indicated that if a plaintiff's 
allegations "fail to state a constitutional violation at all, the 
court cannot find that the constitutional rights asserted . . . 
were clearly established at the time the defendants acted." 
 The district court went on to indicate that a showing 
that a defendant has violated a state statute does not in itself 
establish liability.  It also said that a federal court is "'not 
the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of 
personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies,'" 
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quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 
(1976), and that "'[d]isputes over overtime, over work 
assignments, over lunch and coffee breaks do not implicate the 
great objectives of the 14th Amendment,'" quoting Brown v. 
Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 365 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).  The 
court recognized that Ferraro asserted the defendants acted with 
malice in forcing him to shovel snow and sand, and thus caused 
him to suffer a heart attack, but it held, citing Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982), that 
these "bare allegations of malice" did not overcome the 
appellees' claim of immunity.  Ultimately, the court dismissed 
the claims against the individual appellees "for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) on the grounds of qualified immunity" and the claims 
against Long Branch itself because Ferraro had not asserted a 
claim on which relief could be granted.  The court then remanded 
the balance of the case to the Superior Court. 
 Ferraro has filed a timely appeal.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the district court had 
removal federal question jurisdiction.  We exercise plenary 
review. 
 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
 Ferraro defines the rather limited scope of his claim 
by acknowledging that he "was neither deprived of his job nor his 
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salary and benefits" and accordingly conceding that he was not 
discharged, directly or constructively.  Brief at 16.  Rather, he 
contends that "he was deprived of the rights, duties and 
privileges of [his] job," brief at 16, because the "case does not 
involve mere work assignments, hours or other personnel 
decisions.  It involves the duties which are the essence of [his] 
job title."  Brief at 19.  The district court rejected Ferraro's 
claim inasmuch as it found that he had not demonstrated that he 
had a right which the federal courts should protect and which the 
appellees had violated.  See Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 
1793 (1991). 
 We agree with the district court.  We recognize that we 
look to state law to determine if Ferraro in this section 1983 
action has alleged the existence of a property right.  Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972); 
Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 
679 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1668 (1992). 
Furthermore, we will assume that the appellees could be 
determined in a state proceeding to have violated the New Jersey 
Administrative Code by assigning Ferraro "to perform duties other 
than those properly pertaining to the assigned title which the 
employee holds."  N.J. Admin. Code tit. 4A, § 3-3.4 (1993). 
Indeed, we even will assume that the appellees, as Ferraro 
pleads, are liable to him under New Jersey common law.  Yet we 
decline Ferraro's invitation to hold that the change in his work 
assignment, which he admits did not rise to a level of wrongdoing 
constituting a constructive discharge, nevertheless was a 
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deprivation of his property interests actionable under section 
1983.  While Ferraro asserts that the appellees were trying to 
harass him into resigning and thus were malicious in their 
conduct toward him, if we considered that a mere change in work 
assignment deprived an employee of a property interest, as a 
practical matter we would be federalizing routine employment 
decisions.1  Additionally, under the guise of protecting 
employees' rights, we would be erecting a barrier to ordinary 
management determinations regarding the assignment and duties of 
employees. 
 We recognize that Ferraro claims that prior to the 
appellees' acts in changing his duties his responsibilities were 
"largely managerial and administrative," though not "directorial 
or policymaking," brief at 27, and that after the changes he 
supervised fewer people and did more manual labor.  But, as he 
concedes, the appellees did not change his job title or modify 
his salary and benefits.  Furthermore, his modified duties 
clearly related to the functioning of the department of the 
municipal government in which he is employed, parks and public 
property.  In these circumstances, Ferraro simply did not plead 
facts justifying a section 1983 action.  Congress did not pass 
                                                           
1In Winn v. Lynn, 941 F.2d 236, 239-40 (3d Cir. 1991), we 
rejected a contention that evidence of malice would strip the 
defendants of a defense of qualified immunity which they 
otherwise would enjoy under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982), as qualified immunity is predicated on 
objective standards.  While Winn v. Lynn well could be 
controlling here, we are deciding this case on the basis of our 
determination that the appellees did not deprive Ferraro of a 
property interest.  
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the civil rights law to constitute the district courts as grand 
arbiters of all public employer-employee disputes.  We think that 
the language of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San 
Bernardino Physicians' Serv. Medical Group v. County of San 
Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in 
original), though written in a different context, is useful in 
this case in its recognition that while the deprivation of 
contractual rights may create a section 1983 claim, there is "an 
equally compelling necessity to recognize that not every 
interference with contractual expectations does so."              
 We find Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 
1988), useful in our analysis.  There a public employee brought a 
section 1983 action making claims similar to those Ferraro 
advances.  In Rode the plaintiff alleged that she was transferred 
to another position at her preexisting salary and benefit level. 
She predicated her complaint on the contention that the new 
position did not have the stature of her old position as it did 
not come with a private office and involved menial assignments 
and demeaning tasks.  We indicated that "[e]mployment decisions 
such as those at issue here, which do not terminate or abridge 
[the employee's] employment contract, and which could be 
litigated in state tribunals, do not constitute deprivations of 
property interests under the fourteenth amendment."  Id. at 1205. 
We then cited Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1983), for 
the proposition that even employment decisions which do violate 
employment contracts do not form the bases for section 1983 
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actions and that the Constitution should not be "trivialized by 
being dragged into every dispute in state and local government."2 
 Other precedents support our result.  The Supreme Court 
set out the approach we should follow in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 
at 349, 96 S.Ct. at 2080, when it indicated that the federal 
courts are "not the appropriate forum in which to review the 
multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public 
agencies."  In Brown v. Brienen the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, in language particularly pertinent here, 
indicated that disputes "over work assignments . . . do not 
implicate the great objects of the Fourteenth Amendment."  722 
F.2d at 365.  The court indicated, however, that "[a] public 
employer who drove an employee having a contract of employment to 
resign by making life unbearable for him, through excessive 
demands for overtime or other breaches of the employment 
contract, might be violating the Fourteenth Amendment and section 
1983 [through a] constructive discharge."  Id.  Brown v. Brienen 
is particularly significant because it distinguishes between 
actions constituting a constructive discharge and lesser 
allegedly wrongful conduct for section 1983 purposes.  In this 
                                                           
2Id. (citing Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d at 365).  In Rode, we 
indicated that a pattern of harassment not implicating an 
employee's property rights may constitute a Fourteenth Amendment 
violation if "motivated by the employee's exercise of protected 
constitutional rights or by [the employer's] invidious 
discriminatory intent."  This principle, even if still viable, is 
inapplicable in this case, as Ferraro did not plead that the 
appellees acted in revenge for his engaging in constitutionally 
protected conduct, e.g., making a statement protected by the 
First Amendment, and he did not plead that the appellees 
discriminated against him by reason of a factor such as race, 
religion, or gender. 
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regard we emphasize that Ferraro does not claim to have been 
constructively discharged.  In Wargat v. Long, 590 F. Supp. 1213, 
1215 (D. Conn. 1984), the court indicated "that personnel 
decisions short of termination do not constitute a deprivation of 
a property interest under the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment."3   
 Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481 (11th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1586 (1993), is also a useful 
precedent.  In that case the plaintiffs, police officers, claimed 
that they were transferred in violation of their procedural due 
process rights in retaliation for whistleblowing about wrongdoing 
in the police department.  The court of appeals rejected this 
argument, indicating that it would not "hold that a transfer, 
which involves no loss of pay and no loss of rank, deprives a 
plaintiff of a protected liberty or property interest."  Id. at 
1486.  That holding covers the situation here.4     
                                                           
3While we hold that the appellees did not deprive Ferraro of a 
protected property interest, as we indicate below we are not 
holding that an adverse employment action short of termination 
never could deprive an employee of a property interest as we have 
no reason to consider that broad proposition on this appeal. 
Thus, we are not to be understood as adopting the full statement 
of the law which we quote from Wargat v. Long.  The statement, 
however, is applicable here. 
4In his brief, Ferraro sets forth that his "complaint spoke in 
general terms of the deprivation of certain vested rights rather 
than specifically setting forth the manner in which the 
defendants acted to deprive the plaintiff of his rights and 
clearly identifying those rights.  Such generality is not fatal. 
It can easily be handled by providing a more definite statement." 
Brief at 32.  The difficulty with this contention is that Ferraro 
has described how the appellees' conduct impacted on him, i.e., 
he was not constructively discharged, and he has identified his 
protected property interest in his job.  His case has failed 
because he has not demonstrated that the appellees deprived him 
11 
 In reaching our result, we need not and will not write 
broadly, as we are concerned only with deciding the case before 
us.  Thus, we do not determine whether an adverse employment 
action not alleged to have constituted a constructive discharge 
of an employee can ever give rise to a section 1983 action. 
Rather, we hold only that Ferraro does not state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, as he concedes that he was not 
discharged actually or constructively, his salary and benefits 
were not affected adversely by the appellees' actions, the 
appellees did not strip him of his job title, and he was not 
transferred to a different agency of the municipal government.   
 The judgment of August 31, 1993, will be affirmed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of a property interest.  This shortcoming could not be cured by 
the proposed more definite statement describing appellees' 
actions and motives in more detail. 
 
    Ferraro further contends that the district court erred in 
indicating that his claims predicated on appellees' conduct 
before December 23, 1990, two years before he filed his Superior 
Court complaint, are barred by the statute of limitations.  We 
need not consider this contention as Ferraro does not set forth 
facts indicating that the appellees' conduct before December 23, 
1990, deprived him of a property interest. 
